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DEFINING TORTURE: BRIDGING THE GAP
BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY
Julianne Harper*
In extreme situations when human lives and dignity are
at stake, neutrality is a sin. It helps the killers, not the
victims.
-Elie Wiesel 1
I.

TORTURE: A TOOL OF TERROR

Gabriel Shumba was a lawyer and activist for the
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.
On January 14,
2003, Zimbabwean officials arrested Gabriel; at the time, he
was defending an opposition Member of Parliament.' The
officials detained Gabriel and four others for three days.4 In
an underground torture chamber, more than twenty members
of the secret police and army personnel interrogated Gabriel.'
His torturers subjected him to electric shocks on his feet,
tongue, and genitals.6 The torturers urinated upon him and

* Senior Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 49; J.D.
Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Political Science and
Spanish, University of San Diego. I would like to thank Santa Clara University
Professor Beth Van Schaack for her invaluable contribution to this Comment
and my mother, Cynthia Harper, for passing to me an ever-idealistic worldview.
1. Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize Winner, Address upon Receiving the
Congressional Gold Medal (Apr. 19, 1985) (transcript available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/RR4_19-85.html).
2. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Stories of Torture in the 21st Century
(June 26, 2003), availableat http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENG
POL300052003?open&of=ENG-EGY.
3. Press Release, Zimb. Exiles Forum, Gabriel Shumba Versus the
Government of Zimbabwe/Tortured Lawyer Argues Case at African Commission
(Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://platform.blogs.com/passionofthepresent/2005/
12/gabrielshumba_.html.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, supra note 2.
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forced him to drink his own blood.' Following his release,
Gabriel received numerous threats; knowing he would be
killed if he remained in Zimbabwe, he fled to South Africa.'
He remains in exile. 9 Gabriel brought his case before the
African Commission on Human and People's Rights (the
"ACHPR") in December 2005.10 Although the ACHPR was
due to announce its verdict on Gabriel's case during its thirtyninth ordinary session in May 2006, it deferred its decision
until the following session, scheduled for November 2006.11
However, during its fortieth session, the ACHPR again failed
12
to address Gabriel's case.
Torture stands today as one of the most proscribed
practices under international law. 3 Described as "a cruel
assault upon the defenseless,"14 its "general aim [is] . . . to

destroy a human being, destroy his personality, identity, ....
[and] soul."'1 5

Torture is considered universally abhorrent,

regarded as a jus cogens norm of international human rights
law. 6 This is reflected through the unqualified condemnation
of both torture and cruel and inhuman treatment or
punishment found in every major international human rights
treaty to date.7 Moreover, the prohibition of torture is the
7. Press Release, Zimb. Exiles Forum, supra note 3.
8. Int'l Fed. for Human Rights, Observatory for the Protection of Human
Rights Defenders Annual Report 2006-Zimbabwe, Mar. 14, 2007,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48747cd823.html.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 496 (2007).

14. Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 125 (1978).

15. Bent Sorensen & Inge Kemp Genefke, Medical Aspects of Torture, in
THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TORTURE 11, 12 (Antonio Cassese ed.,
1991).
16. See VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 496. Ajus cogens norm is

"[a] mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted and
recognized by the international community as a norm from which no derogation
is permitted." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004).
17. See VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 496; see generally Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field arts. 3(1)(a), 12, 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, arts. 3,
12, 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 3, 17, 87, 130, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva
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subject of its own widely recognized multilateral treaty."8
Torture has been denounced by the International Criminal
Tribunals in both the former Yugoslavia (the "ICTY") 19 and
Rwanda (the "ICTR"),2 ° by judges throughout the world, and
by authoritative statements of international law.2" Torture is
officially proscribed by every government and under all
circumstances, even in cases of war or national emergency.2 2
Indeed, the prohibition is absolute.
Yet, despite universal condemnation of torture and illtreatment, a true definition of what constitutes "torture"
under international law has yet to be determined. The 1984
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the
"Torture Convention"),2 3 a multilateral treaty designed to
provide the guiding authority in the international case
against torture, offers a blurred and interpretive definition of
torture.24 Due to this amorphous definition, signatory States
charged with implementing laws that prohibit torture into
their own domestic codes enjoy a considerable degree of
discretion when defining the term. Many States have strayed
from the Torture Convention's definition considerably,
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 3,
31, 32, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 6516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter
European Convention on Human Rights] ("No one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR Statute]; American Convention on Human Rights art. 5,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 146 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of
their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person."); African Charter on Human and People's Rights art. 5, opened for
signature June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 60; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A(III), art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
18. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No.
100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
19. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
20. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C.
Res. 995, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE U.S. § 7
(1987).

22. See VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 496.
23. Torture Convention, supra note 18.
24. See id. art. 1.
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publicly condemning torture in accordance with the Torture
Convention's mandate, but narrowly defining it so as to allow
individuals to engage in behavior that defies the Torture
Convention's aim.25 Notwithstanding the clear prohibition in
many areas of the world, torture remains a tool of state policy
that is deeply engrained in law enforcement practices.26
The search for a clear definition of torture has become a
pressing legal issue within the international community.2 7
Such a definition is necessary for the creation of conclusive,
binding standards against torture and thus is the essential
catalyst to spur a worldwide commitment to eradicating
torture.28
This comment begins with an examination of the
definition of torture provided by the Torture Convention, and
it highlights how this definition has manifested in existing
definitions of torture found in both international criminal and
humanitarian law. 29
Next, the analysis turns to the
implications of the Torture Convention's vague definition of
torture, which has allowed States to stray substantially from
the Torture Convention's mandate in domestic prohibitions of
The many disparate definitions have led to
torture.
significant global under-enforcement of torture prohibition
and the perpetuation of the practice.3" This comment then
analyzes how signatory States have implemented the Torture
Convention's definition into their own domestic codes,
focusing upon the States' most significant departures from
the stance taken by international courts. 1 Lastly, this
comment proposes methods to create a more uniform
It recommends that the Torture
definition of torture.
Convention's framers clarify and restructure the definition of
torture so that the international fight to eradicate torture
may gain new strength.2

25. GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 4 (2005).

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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II. DEFINITIONS OF TORTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Most definitions of torture within international law
derive from Article 1, section 1 of the 1984 United Nations
Torture Convention. 3 With its 145 parties,3 4 the Torture
Convention contains the most widely accepted definition of
torture 5 and embodies "a consensus . . . representative of
customary international law."36 The Torture Convention has
certain notable features. For instance, Article 2 obligates all
States party to the Torture Convention to take "effective
legislative, administrative, judicial, or other measures to
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction. '"" Article 4 serves to "ensure that all acts of
torture are offenses under its [national] criminal law."38
Additionally, the Torture Convention follows the principle of
compulsory universal application: its mandate is applicable to
all States of the world such that even acts of torture
committed in non-signatory States are punishable within a
State party to the Torture Convention. 9
In this vein,
signatory States may not extradite any person if there are
substantial grounds to believe that the person may be
subjected to torture in the State requesting the extradition.4 °
Further, the Torture Convention seeks to ensure that an
individual charged with committing an act of torture cannot
claim as a defense that the act or acts were ordered by a

33. Torture Convention, supra note 18, art. 1, 1.
34. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment
or
Punishment,
New
York,
10
December
1984,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/9.htm (last visited Dec. 23,

2008).
35. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 6; see also VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra
note 13, at 499.
36. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, $ 160 (Dec.
10, 1998).
37. Torture Convention, supra note 18, art. 2, $ 1.
38. Id. art. 4, 1.
39. See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT 178-89 (1988) (interpreting Article 5 of the Torture Convention).

40. Torture Convention, supra note 18, art. 3,
1 ("No State Party shall
expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture.").
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Lastly, under the
superior officer of public authority. 41
Torture Convention, evidence obtained through torture must
be rendered inadmissible in the criminal justice system of any
signatory State.4 2
The Torture Convention defines torture as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
only from,
It does not include pain or suffering arising
43
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
This definition includes four elements: 44 (1) the
intentional infliction (2) of severe pain or suffering (3) for one
of the enumerated purposes (4) by someone acting on behalf
of a State.46 Signatory States throughout the international
community have developed these elements more fully as they
endeavor to implement the Torture Convention's mandate
into their own jurisprudence. Each element represents an
integral part of an ever-evolving definition of torture.
A. The IntentionalInfliction Requirement
Under the Torture Convention, acts alleged to constitute
torture must be inflicted intentionally.4 6 Thus, if one were to
suffer severe pain at the hands of an individual, but that
individual did not intend to inflict harm through his actions,
the act would not amount to torture. Both the ICTY and the
ICTR have retained this general intent requirement as
41. Id. art. 2, 1 3.
42. Id. art. 15.
43. Id. art. 1, 1.
44. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 6; VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13,
at 499.
45. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 499.
46. Id. This is a general intent requirement. Id. In the first draft of the
Torture Convention to the United Nations, two Swedish representatives
explained that "where pain or suffering is the result of an accident or mere
negligence, the criteria for regarding the act as torture are not fulfilled."
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 39, at 118.
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provided by the Torture Convention.
The European Court of Human Rights (the "ECHR") also
has retained the Torture Convention's intent requirement,
but it has created a less stringent standard by shifting the
burden of proof from the victim to the government.4 8 For
4 9 the ECHR concluded that
example, in Selmouni v. France,
"where an individual is taken into police custody in good
health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is
incumbent on the state to provide a plausible explanation of
how those injuries were caused."5 0 Thus, even though the
ECHR uncovered no explicit evidence of intent (nor the
identity of the perpetrator), it concluded that the State had
tortured the individual because the State could not offer an
explanation as to how the injuries occurred.5 1 The physical
evidence of harm while the victim was in police custody,
coupled with the testimony of the victim, was sufficient to
trigger a presumption of intent.2
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture, a multilateral South American treaty signed in 1985,
similarly retained the intent requirement.5 3 It states that
"torture shall be understood to be any act intentionally
performed."5 4
In examining this definition, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (the "IACHR") took an even
more expansive stance than did the ECHR with respect to the
meaning of "intent." In Morales v. Guatemala,5 5 the IACHR
47. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 499.
Reinforcing the
importance of this element, the ICTY explained in the 2002 case, Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, that
even if a perpetrator's motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow
that the perpetrator does not have the intent to commit an act of
torture or that his conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, since such pain or suffering is a likely and
logical consequence of his conduct.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment,
153
(June 12, 2002).
48. MILLER, supra note 25, at 13.
49. Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149.
50. Id. at 193.
51. See id.
52. See id; see also MILLER, supra note 25, at 13.
53. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec.
9, 1985, O.A.S. T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519 [hereinafter Inter-American
Convention].
54. Id.
55. Paniagua-Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 37
(Mar. 8, 1998), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
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found that Guatemalan officials had committed torture on the
basis of autopsies that reliably revealed signs of beating,

tying, and visible cuts and burns to the victim's face and
body.56 At a public hearing set to determine the amount of
the victim's reparations, the Court stated unequivocally that
the
damage inflicted on the victim is evident because it is only
human nature that any person subjected to the aggression

and abuse that she endured (unlawful detention, torture,
and death) experiences profound physical and mental
suffering ....

The Court considers
that no evidence is
57

required to reach this conclusion.
In this case, the court inferred the perpetrator's intent from
circumstances and consequently reached a torture conviction
without ever examining the true intent of the perpetrator.
While the torture analysis often hinges upon whether the
intent requirement has been met, international courts appear
to construe the element liberally.
B. The Severe Pain or Suffering Requirement
To constitute torture under the Torture Convention's
definition, the harm inflicted upon a victim must amount to
"severe pain or suffering.""8 However, since the Torture
Convention provides no definition of the key term, "severe,"
international courts tend to interpret it broadly. During the
early stages of the Torture Convention's creation, the drafters
aggressively debated the inclusion of the word "severe. '59 A

number of proposals were made for its deletion; however, all
such proposals were defeated upon the conclusion that the "
'severity' of the pain or suffering is the essential ingredient
for establishing that the conduct amounts to torture." °
seriec_37_ing.pdf.
56. See id. at T$ 134, 181.
57. Judgment of May 25, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 76 (May 25,
2001) at
106, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts//iachr/C/76ing.html. It must be noted here that international human rights bodies such as
the ECHR and the IACHR generally are designed to establish responsibility of
States rather than individual criminal liability. Consequently, presumptions
about intent reflected in the above IACHR decision operate more successfully
when evaluated in the state responsibility context.
58. Torture Convention, supra note 18, art. 1, 1.
59. AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 16 (1999).

60. Id. Later, alternative workings, such as "extreme" or "extremely severe"
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Unfortunately, it is "virtually impossible" to ascertain how
severe inhuman treatment must be to qualify as torture.6 '
Accordingly, the lack of clarity regarding what constitutes
"severe pain or suffering" has given international courts
remarkable latitude in their interpretations of the Torture
Convention's severity requirement.
The ECHR was one of the first courts to examine the
measure of severity required for an act to constitute torture
under its own treaty, the European Convention on Human
Rights. 62 The court concluded that torture fell at the extreme
end of a wide spectrum of pain-inducing acts.6" In Ireland v.
United Kingdom, the court evaluated certain "sensory
deprivation" techniques applied by security forces in
Northern Ireland as a means to obtain information from
detainees of suspected terrorist activities. 4 The court held
that the five techniques, including wall-standing, hooding,
subjection to continuous noise, deprivation of sleep, and
deprivation of food and drink, did not rise to the level of
torture but did constitute inhuman and degrading
treatment.6 5
The court concluded that the European
Convention on Human Right's "distinction [between torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment] derives principally
from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted,"
and that the term "torture" "attache[d] a special stigma to
deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering."6 6 The five techniques thus "did not occasion
suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by
the word torture as so understood."6 7
The ECHR found support for the notion of a hierarchical
relationship between torture and other cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment ("CIDT") in General Assembly

pain, were suggested; however, the phrase "severe pain" was considered to be
sufficient to convey the idea that only acts of certain gravity shall constitute
torture. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 39, at 117-18.
61. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 517.

62. Id.; see European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17.
63. MILLER, supra note 25, at 8.
64. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66 (1978); Johan
D. van der Vyver, Torture As a Crime Under InternationalLaw, 67 ALB. L. REV.
427, 447 (2003).
65. Ireland,25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66-67.
66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 67.
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Adopted unanimously by the
Resolution 3452 (XXX). 68
members of the United Nations in 1975,69 this Resolution
states that "[t]orture constitutes an aggravated and
deliberate form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
Both the jurisprudence of international
punishment."70
human rights and international criminal law reflect this
concept of hierarchy by employing a sliding scale to determine
whether an act constitutes torture or CIDT.7 '
However, in Selmouni v. France, the ECHR modified its
position, declaring that "certain acts which were classified in
the past as 'inhuman and degrading treatment' as opposed to
'torture' could be qualified differently in the future." 72 It held
that "the increasingly high standard being required in the
area of the protection of human rights and fundamental
liberties correspondingly . . . requires greater firmness in
assessing breaches of the fundamental values in democratic
societies. 7 3
In determining whether an act causes severe pain or
suffering, some courts examine the subjective impact on the
particular victim. 74 To measure the subjective impact, courts
consider a particular victim's physical or mental disposition,
including the vulnerability of children and pregnant women.75
To illustrate, in Z and Others v. United Kingdom, the ECHR
evaluated factors such as "the physical and mental effects on
the person experiencing the harm, the duration of the act,

68. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 518.

69. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. AIRES/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975).
70. Id. art. 1,

2; see also VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 518.

71. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 8-10.
72. Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 183, 183.
73. Id. Specifically, the court held that under this increasingly high
standard, medically certified traumas on the body inflicted by sustained
beatings occurring over a period of days, such as punches, kicks, and blows with
a truncheon and baseball bat, constituted torture. Nigel S. Rodley, The
Definition(s) of Torture in InternationalLaw, in 55 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS
467, 476 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 2002); see Selmouni, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at
183.
74. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 10.
75. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, Question of the
Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, in Particular:Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, TTl 15-25, U.N. DOc. E/CN.4/1995/34 (Jan. 12, 1995)
(preparedby Nigel S. Rodley).
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and the age, sex, and culture of the person experiencing the
harm."76 The court held specifically that the State had an
obligation to protect children from severe harm.77
Confounding the issue even further, the ICTY created a
case-by-case test in evaluating the severity requirement,
considering both objective and subjective factors to
distinguish torture from CIDT.7" The ICTY evaluates not
only objective standards such as the "nature, purpose, and
consistency of the acts committed," but also subjective factors
like "the physical or mental condition of the victim, the effect
of the treatment,... the victim's age, sex, state of health, and
position of inferiority."7 9 Taking the analysis one step
further, in one instance, the ICTY considered "the specific
social, cultural, and religious background of the victims,"80
maintaining that "in certain circumstances the suffering can
be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions." 8
Due to ambiguity surrounding the severity requirement,
establishing a dividing line between torture and CIDT has
proven a difficult task. This has created a dilemma for
States; while the Torture Convention prohibits both torture
and "other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,"
it only requires that States criminalize torture. 2 This invites
States to commit inhumane acts, so long as they can evade
the requisite level of severity that constitutes torture. If an
act is defined as CIDT, a lesser violation, States generally do
not criminalize the act. As a result, States lack standards by
83
which to determine precisely what treatment is prohibited.

76. Z and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29392/95, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep.
97, 121 (2002).
77. Id. at 131.
78. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 517; see also Prosecutor v.
Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment (Sept. 1, 2004).
79. Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-T at 484.
80. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment,
237 (Nov. 30,
2005).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Torture Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4-5; VAN SCHAACK & SLYE,
supra note 13, at 513.
83. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 2-5. However, the ICTR has made
proactive steps in this direction by criminalizing "cruel treatment," "outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment" and
"other inhumane acts." ICTR Statute, supra note 20, arts. 3-4.
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C. The Enumerated PurposesRequirement
A particular act will only constitute torture if the
perpetrator acts with a specific purpose to punish or
By the Torture Convention's
intimidate the victim.8 4
standards, the torturer must have committed the act for
"such purposes as obtaining from [the victim] or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act
he or a third person has committed . . . or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind ... ."5 The purpose requirement
of mistreatment,
thus distinguishes torture from other types
6
including indiscriminate acts of violence.1
While drafting the Torture Convention, parties disputed
whether the definition of torture should include a reference to
the actor's purpose for intentionally inflicting severe pain or
This debate resulted in a compromise-the
suffering.8 7
Torture Convention lists certain common purposes, but the
list is not exhaustive. 8 Of course, purposes other than those
listed may qualify under the definition; however, the words
"such . . . as" imply that the other purposes must bear
similarity to the purposes that are enumerated explicitly. 9
With the exception of crimes against humanity, as
defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court, 9° the notion of purpose seems to be central to
the understanding of the concept of torture in international
law. 9 A reference to purpose is included in both Article 2 of
the Inter-American Torture Convention 92 and the Elements of
84. See Torture Convention, supra note 18, art. 1, T 1.
85. Id.
86. Van Schaack & Slye, supra note 13, at 501.
87. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 39, at 118. France considered the
motives of the perpetrators to be irrelevant, while the United States suggested
that the definition of torture should state that the act must be deliberate and
malicious. Id. at 46.
88. Id. at 118.
89. Id.
90. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, 1 1, July 17,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/
officialjournaIRome Statute_-English.pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute] (" 'Crime
against humanity' means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: (a) murder, (b) extermination, (c) enslavement, . . . (f)
torture.... ").
91. Rodley, supra note 73, at 481.
92. Inter-American Convention, supra note 53, art. 2.
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Crimes concerning the war crime of torture under the Rome
Statute with respect to both international and noninternational armed conflict.93
Within international human rights law, the Torture
Convention's
purpose requirement
carries particular
strength. The ECHR has employed the Torture Convention
definition consistently. Beginning this trend in The Greek
Case in 1969, the ECHR stated that torture is inhuman
treatment "that has purpose, such as the obtaining of
94
information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment."
Recently, the Court required the purposive element in two
cases against Cyprus: the ECHR held in both Egmez v.
Cyprus and Denizci v. Cyprus that, while officials had
subjected victims to varying degrees of ill-treatment
intentionally, such treatment did not amount to torture
because the victims could not establish that the officers' aim
was to extract a confession.9 5
The International Criminal Tribunals also have required
the purposive element consistently, particularly in recent
cases in which the trial chambers equated rape with torture.9 6
For instance, in Prosecutor v. Delalic, the ICTY accepted
those purposes listed in the Torture Convention as
"representative;" 7 however, the trial chamber reaffirmed that
"there is no requirement that the conduct . .
be solely
perpetrated for a prohibited purpose."9 8 Further, the trial
93. Rome Statute, supra note 90, art. 8, 2.
94. Report of the European Commission of Human Rights on the "Greek
Case," 1969 12 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n of H.R.) 1, 5 (1969).
95. See Denizci v. Cyprus, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 225, 312-13; Egmez v.
Cyprus, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 315, 336. In the Inter-American system, the
purposive element has been similarly integral. Rodley, supra note 73, at 48182. The purposive element has been particularly relevant in rape cases; in
Mejia v.Peru, the court found that an act of rape by a state official constitutes
torture when its purpose is to punish and intimidate the victim. Mejia v. Peru,
Case 10.970, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L.N/II.91, doc.7, at
157 (1996), available at http://www.cidh.org/women/peru10970.eng.htm.
96. Rodley, supra note 73, at 483.
97. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 9$ 470-71 (Nov.
16, 1998).
98. Id. The Trial Chamber elaborated on this proposition by drawing a
distinction between a "prohibited purpose" for which torture is inflicted, and a
purely private purpose, such as rape or sexual assault. Id. It concluded that,
though these acts traditionally have been considered private conduct, and thus
precluded from punishment under international law, "the purposive elements of
intimidation, coercion, punishment or discrimination can often be integral
components of behaviour, thus bringing the relevant conduct within the
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court in Prosecutor v. Furundzija retained the list of
enumerated purposes contained in the Torture Convention,
but added that "among the possible purposes of torture one
must also include that of humiliating the victim."9 9 The court
based this conclusion upon the general spirit of international
humanitarian law, the primary purpose of which is to
safeguard human dignity. °°
D. The State Action or Public Official Requirement
Finally, to establish an act of torture under the Torture
Convention, the act must be "inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity."'' 1 Thus, even the
most egregious forms of abuse will not be considered torture
in violation of the Torture Convention unless the State is
somehow involved.1"2 This requirement stems from the idea
that only torture for which the authorities can be held
responsible should fall within the Torture Convention's
The drafters reasoned that if a private
definition.1"'
individual criminally committed torture without the
involvement of any State authority, the traditional functions
manage the prosecution
of the domestic legal system would
10 4
perpetrator.
the
of
punishment
and
In most human rights treaties, the definition of torture
However, in some
expressly requires state action.10 5
definition." Id. Thus, the court concluded that the rape inflicted against two
non-Serbian women by a Serbian prison guard at the Celebici Prison Camp
amounted to torture. See id. at 1 1285.
99. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, J 162 (Dec.
10, 1998).
100. Id.
101. Torture Convention, supra note 18, art. 1, 1. Acts of torture, or other
forms of ill-treatment committed by members of law enforcement agencies,
paramilitary groups, civil defense forces, or other forces operating with or
tolerated by the government fall within this definition. See U.N. OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET NO. 4, METHODS OF COMBATING
TORTURE J 7(a) (1987), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/

fs4.htm [hereinafter OHCHR FACT SHEET].
102. MILLER, supra note 25, at 17. During the travau prdparatoires,much

discussion was devoted to whether or not an act of the kind referred to in Article
1 should be regarded as torture irrespective of who committed the act.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 39, at 119.
103. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 39, at 119.
104. Id. at 119-20.
105. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 502. The major exceptions to
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instances, the state action requirement has been interpreted
broadly, arguably granting courts the power to ignore the
requirement altogether. For example, in 1992, the Human
Rights Committee (the "HRC") stated that the protection
offered by Article 7 of the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights °6 was not limited to acts committed by or at
the instigation of public officials and announced that States
have a responsibility to protect individuals from interference
by private parties. 1 7 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
echoed this sentiment a decade later, declaring that the state
action requirement was satisfied when public officials were
"unwilling to provide effective protection from ill-treatment
(i.e. fail to prevent or remedy such acts), including illtreatment by non-State actors."08 The Special Rapporteur's
conclusion indicated that state inaction in the face of private
violence may constitute a violation of the treaty provision on
torture.'0 9
In Z and Others v. United Kingdom, the ECHR adopted a
similarly broad understanding of the state action
requirement, holding the government accountable for
inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted upon four
children by their parents."10 The court held that beyond the
state official requirement articulated in the Torture
Convention, States must take measures to ensure that
individuals within their particular jurisdiction are not
subjected to torture or ill treatment, including ill-treatment
administered by private individuals."' The court ruled that
since the State knew or should have known that the children
were at risk of severe parental abuse, the State had an
affirmative obligation to prevent torture or inhuman or

this are acts of torture committed as a part of genocide, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes. Id.
106. ICCPR Statute, supra note 17, art. 7 ("No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
107. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Judgment, 166 (June 12, 2002).
108. MILLER, supra note 25, at 18. For a discussion on the role of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Torture, see OHCHR FACT SHEET, supra note 101, at
8.
109. MILLER, supra note 25, at 18 (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. See Z and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29392/95, 34 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 97, 131 (2002).
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degrading treatment.1 12 Despite the broad interpretation of
the state action provision adopted by the U.N. and the ECHR,
the Torture Convention does not state that the inaction of
public officials to prevent or punish private abuses is a
113
violation of its precepts.
The Committee Against Torture, the body created to
monitor State compliance with the Torture Convention, has
relaxed the state action requirement somewhat in cases
involving States that lack an effective government. 1 4 To
illustrate, in Elmi v. Australia, a Somali citizen brought a
claim challenging an Australian decision ordering that he
return to Somalia." 5 The Committee Against Torture, noting
the lack of effective government or legitimate state actors in
Somalia, held that a fear of severe ill treatment at the hands
of groups that have established "quasi-governmental
institutions" and that "de facto . . . exercise certain
prerogatives that are comparable to those normally exercised
by legitimate governments" constitutes torture." 6
International criminal law has been less consistent in
requiring state action than international human rights law,
and in many instances it has not attached any particular
status to the perpetrator. 1 7 In the protections afforded to
victims under the Geneva Convention, the status of the victim
rather than that of the perpetrator determines criminal
responsibility."' Similarly, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I
112. Id. at 131-32.
113. MILLER, supra note 25, at 18.
114. See id. at 18-20.
115. Elmi v. Australia, Comm. No. 120/1998, U.N. Comm. Against Torture,
22d Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998,
3.1 (1999).
"Refouler" is
prohibited by Article 3 of the Torture Convention. Torture Convention, supra
note 18, art. 3.
116. Elmi v. Australia, Comm. No. 120/1998, U.N. Comm. Against Torture,
22d Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, TTJ6.5-7 (1999). However, three
years later the region had stabilized and the court reconsidered its holding in
Elmi, limiting that decision to the "exceptional situation" at the time that Elmi
was decided. H.M.H.I. v. Australia, Comm. No. 177/2000, U.N. Comm. Against
Torture, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/D/177/2001 (2002), 6.4 ("[W]ith three
years elapsing since the Elmi decision, Somalia currently possesses a State
authority in the form of the Transitional National Government
[aiccordingly, the Committee does not consider this case to fall within the
exceptional situation in Elmi, and takes the view that acts of such entities as
are now in Somalia commonly fall outside the scope of article 3 of the
Convention.")
117. Rodley, supra note 73, at 487.
118. Geneva Convention III, supra note 17, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV,
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omits the "state official" requirement altogether. 119 This
article prohibits torture under all circumstances, whether
committed by a military official or a civilian.2
The Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court 121 further
demonstrates the trend to omit the public official requirement
in international criminal definitions of torture, stating plainly
that " '[t]orture' means the intentional infliction of severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person
122
in the custody or under the control of the accused."
Additionally, the statute dedicates an entire article to
denoting the "[i]rrelevance of official capacity" 123 of the
perpetrator, providing that the statute shall apply "equally to
all persons without any distinction based on official
1 24
capacity."
While the ICTY has not declared with any consistency
that state action is required for a conviction of torture,'12 its
latest decisions indicate that the Tribunal has joined the
international criminal law movement toward omission of this
requirement.
Both the trial chamber in Prosecutor v.
Delalic126 and the appeals chamber in Prosecutor v.
Furundzija12 required the involvement of a public official.
However, in a more recent case, following a lengthy analysis
of the crime of torture under both international human rights
and international criminal law, the appeals chamber in
Prosecutor v. Kunarac determined that "the public official

supra note 17, art. 147 (guaranteeing the protection of wounded and sick
soldiers on the battlefield and at sea, shipwrecked persons, prisoners of war,
and civilians under enemy control).
119. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Conflicts art. 75, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
120. Id.
121. The International Criminal Court is an independent, permanent court
that tries persons accused of the most serious crimes of international concern,
namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. See generally
Rome Statute, supra note 90.
122. Id. art. 7, 2.
123. Id. art. 27.
124. Id. art. 27, 1 1.
125. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 511.

126. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 91 473, 494 (Nov.
16, 1998).
127. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 9$111 (Dec.
10, 1998). The court additionally stated that the crime required that someone
acting in a non-private capacity commit the act. Id.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

requirement is not a requirement under customary
international law in relation to the criminal responsibility of
an individual for torture outside of the framework of the
Torture Convention."1 28
The Torture Convention has settled firmly into the
mechanisms of international law, serving as the helm that
steers the various international bodies' decisions. Some noted
interpretative differences have surfaced, including the
movement toward omission of the state action requirement in
international criminal law, as well as the broadening and
narrowing of certain elements; however, "torture" as defined
in the Torture Convention has grown to represent a
consensus definition within the international community.
Nonetheless, the Torture Convention's vague definition has
left signatory States considerable license to interpret and
innovate.
The consensus reached in the international
community regarding the Torture Convention's principles
does not always translate into States' national and local laws
as intended. Accordingly, the term "torture" has been
redefined and altered, and in many State domestic codes, the
definition fails to capture conduct that the Torture
Convention resolutely prohibits.129
III. LEGAL ISSUE: IMPLICATIONS OF A VAGUE CONVENTIONAL
DEFINITION
It is well established that torture is widely condemned.
Currently, 145 States have ratified the Torture Convention,
and by doing so, have pledged to "take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction." 13 However,
few member States have implemented the definition of
torture as it exists in the text of the Torture Convention. The
nebulous nature of the Torture Convention's definition has
provided States with a considerable degree of discretion to
serve their own interests when translating the Torture
Convention's mandate into domestic law.
The lack of
consensus as to precisely what constitutes torture has led to

128. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment,
148 (June 12, 2002).
129. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 6, 18-19.
130. Torture Convention, supra note 18, art. 2, 1.
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numerous definitional innovations.
Notably, States have departed from the definition by
substantially altering the standards of the severity
requirement, 131 and by omitting the requirement that the act
be committed by a public official.132 Further, many States
have failed to provide a definition of torture in their
legislative codes altogether, 133 thereby failing to establish
effective
standards
of behavior.
This distorted
implementation of the Torture Convention's pronouncements
13 4
has prevented the institution of a uniform prohibition.
The Torture Convention's unclear definition translates
into a vague understanding of its mandate; imprecise
language diminishes both the strength and enforceability of
the Torture Convention. This is demonstrated by a deficiency
in the enforcement and punishment of torture under domestic
criminal codes, especially when public officials are involved.
The State Reports submitted to the U.N. Committee Against
Torture (the "CAT") reflect this assertion, as they provide
evidence of an unbalanced number of violations of torture in
comparison with the number of convictions that result. 35 In
2004, the CAT stated that it was concerned about Argentina's
"many allegations of torture and ill-treatment committed in a
widespread and habitual manner by the State's security
forces and agencies, both in the provinces and the federal
capital," noting a distinct and disturbing "lack of proportion
between the high number of reports of torture and illtreatment and the very small number of convictions for such
offenses, as well as unjustifiable delays in the investigation of
cases of torture." 36 The CAT also pointed to the suspected
impunity of public officials whose acts amounted to torture,
stating among its concerns that there exists a repeated
practice of "miscategorization" of actions by judicial officials
"who treat the crime of torture as a minor offense (such as
131. See infra Part IV.B.
132. See infra Part IV.C.
133. See infra Part IV.A.
134. MILLER, supra note 25, at 6.
135. See U.N. Treaty Body Database, http://www.unhchr.chtbs/doc.nsf/
RepStatfrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Dec. 24, 2008) (providing State
Reports submitted to the U.N. Committee Against Torture between the years
2000 and 2006).
136. U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Report of the Committee Against Torture
34(a), U.N. Doc. A/60/44 (Nov. 16-26, 2004).
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unlawful coercion), which carries a lesser punishment, when
in fact such actions should be categorized as torture."13 v
The CAT's reports to both Albania1 3 and Uganda
produced similar results. In its report to Uganda, the CAT
expressed its concerns about the "continued allegations of
widespread torture and ill-treatment by the State's security
forces and agencies, together with the apparent immunity
enjoyed by its perpetrators.' 1 39 Again, the CAT lamented "the
disproportion between the high number of reports of torture
and ill-treatment and the very small number of convictions
for such offences, as well as the unjustifiable delays in the
investigation of torture, both of which contribute to the
impunity prevailing in this area."140
The CAT gave the same condemnation to the Russian
Federation's Criminal Code, adopted in 1996 and amended in
2002. The CAT noted that Russia had taken some positive
steps toward eradicating torture and other inhumane
treatment.1 4 ' However, the CAT expressed deep concern over
the numerous and consistent allegations of widespread
torture and other CIDT or punishment of detainees
committed by law enforcement personnel, particularly in
attempts to obtain confessions. 142 Russia's latest state report
to the CAT did not mention any cases in which state officials
had been convicted of torture under Article 117.43
Though many States have signed the Torture
Convention, reports demonstrate that the international
community struggles to adhere to the guidelines provided.
137. Id. 34(b).
138. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Report of the Committee Against Torture
83(c), U.N. Doc. A/60/44 (May 2-20, 2005) ("[A] climate of de facto immunity
prevails for law enforcement personnel who commit acts of torture or illtreatment in view of: (i) the numerous allegations of torture and ill-treatment
by law enforcement personnel, especially at the moment of arrest and during
interrogation ... (iv) the absence of conviction in cases of torture under article
86 of the Criminal Code, and the limited number of convictions of torture with
serious consequences under article 87 of the Criminal Code.").
139. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Report of the Committee Against Torture
193(c), U.N. Doc. A/60/44 (May 2-20, 2005).
140. Id. 9193(e).
141. U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Report of the Committee Against Torture at 29
1 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/62/44 (Nov. 6-24, 2006).
142. Id. at 30-31 919.
143. Russian Federation: Torture and Forced Confessions in Detention,
AMNESTY INTL, Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.amnesty.orglen/library/asset/
EUR46/056/2006/en/dom-EUR460562006en.pdf.
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Reports of torture continue to flood in, with torture occurring
in eighty-one countries around the world, and reported deaths
attributable to torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, and
cruel treatment and punishment in prisons."
In failing to guide States toward an acceptable,
enforceable definition of torture, the Torture Convention
thwarts its very purpose: to punish and prevent torture
worldwide. The institution of torture persists internationally,
and many instances of torture have gone unnoticed or
unpunished, as evidenced by the CAT reports. 145 Further,
apart from torture's devastating effects upon its victims, it
has broader consequences for world order. 146 It attacks the
authority and legitimacy of the State, provokes or intensifies
social conflict, and undermines the very idea of peace. 147 In
its tacit claim to unlimited social control, it challenges the
idea of the rule of law itself.148
IV. ANALYSIS: DEPARTURES FROM THE TORTURE
CONVENTION'S MANDATE BY MEMBER STATES

As an international human rights treaty, the Torture
Convention has developed through the jurisprudence of many
international courts; however, as member States implement
the prohibition of torture into their own legal codes as
mandated by the Torture Convention, many fail to translate
The definitions of torture
the guiding law as directed.
assembled in the State reports submitted to the CAT between
the years 2000 and 2006141 confirm that States have deviated
from the Torture Convention's definition in three main areas:
(1) a distinct lack of any definition of torture in legislative
codes, (2) significant divergence from the Torture
Convention's severity requirement, and (3) the omission of
the state action or public official requirement.

144. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2008 (2008), available at
http://thereport.amnesty.orgeng/facts-and-figures.
145. See U.N. Treaty Body Database, supra note 135.
146. Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture:
From Universal Proscriptionto Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV.
Hum. RTs. J. 87, 90 (2001).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. U.N. Treaty Body Database, supra note 135.
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A. Failureto Define Torture
Perhaps most alarming is the fact that many of the
Torture Convention's member States have failed to
sufficiently define, if define at all, the crime of torture in their
domestic legal codes. In 2004, the CAT expressed to both
Switzerland and Finland as a "[s]ubject of concern" that "no
specific definition of torture exists in criminal law covering all
150
the constituent elements of [A]rticle 1 of the Convention."
Similar reports were administered to Austria, Azerbaijan,
Kyrgystan, Uzbekistan, El Salvador, and Paraguay in 2000,151
noting specifically "[t]he incompleteness of the definition of
torture, which leaves unpunished certain aspects of torture as
defined in [A]rticle 1 of the Convention."' 5 2 Additionally,
definitions of torture are simply "not listed" or "not
incorporated" in the State reports of twenty-eight parties to
the CAT, including Costa Rica, the Republic of Korea,
Argentina, Belgium, Denmark, Israel, and the Russian
15 3
Federation.
In 1999, the Israeli Supreme Court illustrated the
difficulties arising with the failure to define torture
sufficiently when it evaluated the legality of interrogation
methods applied to Palestinian captives held within Israeli
Both the CAT and the Special Rapporteur on
territory."5
Torture had concluded previously that the techniques
employed by Israeli officials constituted torture. 5 Despite
these views, the Israeli Supreme Court, while declaring that
a number of these techniques were prohibited interrogation
practices under Israeli law, never made reference specifically
150. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Report of the Committee Against Torture T
64(a), U.N. Doe. CAT/C/CR/3441CHE (May 2-20, 2005); see U.N. GAOR, 34th
Sess., Report of the Committee Against Torture 72(a), U.N. Doc. A/60/44 (May
2-20, 2005).
151. See U.N. Treaty Body Database, supra note 135.
152. U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Report of the Committee Against Torture 9
49(a), 68(a), 74(a), 80(a), 150(b), 160, U.N. Doe. A/55/44 (May 1-19, 2000).
153. MILLER, supra note 25, at A1-A56.
154. Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service's
Interrogation Methods, HCJ 5100/94 (1999) [hereinafter Legality of S.S.
Interrogation Methods].
155. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 518. The techniques in
question included shaking a captive forward and backward, holding someone in
the "Shabach" position, forcing persons being interrogated into a "frog crouch,"
depriving prisoners of sleep, and subjecting detainees to loud music. See
Legality of S.S. Interrogation Methods, supra note 154 at T 14.
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to "torture" or made any efforts to define its limits.'56
Instead, the court used conclusory language to invalidate the
practices, noting that the methods employed "cause[d] the
suspect suffering"'5 7 and that they "infringe[d] upon the
suspect's dignity, his bodily integrity and his basic rights in
an excessive manner."'
Though it certainly declared these
practices illegal under Israeli law, the court never expressly
affirmed that the acts amounted to torture.
The State's reluctance to label illegal acts "torture" in
this case illustrates the power of the term; courts avoid using
it to protect their governments from the stigma of the
crime. 15 9 Essentially, States evade a finding of torture while
16
illegal state practices persist."
In States that have failed to
provide effective definitions of torture within their criminal
codes, citizens and officials find it difficult to distinguish
torture from permissible acts. Consequently, the special
status that the Torture Convention assigns to the term has
deteriorated steadily.
B. States' Divergence from the Torture Convention's
"Severity" Requirement
The "severity requirement" represents a second area of
the Torture Convention that has seen significant degrees of
variation. The Egyptian legislature, somewhat an anomaly,
broadened the term, "impos[ing] no prerequisites concerning
the degree or extent of pain or suffering." 6 ' It provided that
"the offense of torture obtains however slight or negligible the
pain may be and whether or not the torture leaves marks."'62
By contrast, several States employ rather cryptic, ambiguous
definitions of the severity requirement. For example, Latvia
requires that the act must "caus[e] particular pain or

156. See Legality of S.S. Interrogation Methods, supra note 154, at 1 18-32.
157. Id. at %29.
158. Id. at 1 27.
159. MILLER, supra note 25, at 3.
160. Id.
161. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 34th Sess., Considerations of Reports
Submitted by State Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Addendum to
Supplementary Report of Egypt, 9149, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/Add.11 (Jan. 28,
1999) ("The provisions of Egyptian law are broader and more general than those
of the Convention.").
162. Id. %47(c).
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suffering to victims."16 3 While this definition does provide
some threshold, the phrase "particular pain" is imprecise and
unclear, making it difficult to charge the crime of torture, and
easy to circumvent altogether. Similarly, Luxembourg uses
the word "acute" rather than "severe" in its definition of
torture. 6 4 While the term "acute" is roughly synonymous
with "severe," the lack of guidance on what constitutes
"severe" or "acute" pain or suffering or what distinguishes
"particular pain" from the type of pain that would not be
criminalized renders States without effective standards.
Further, it provides States with the opportunity to commit
acts that evade their own domestic definitions of torture and
to undermine the intent of the Torture Convention.
No signatory State has demonstrated the truth of this
paradigm more than the United States. Eliciting a rather
contentious response to its ratification of the Torture
Convention, the United States attached an "understanding,"
specifying that specific intent is required for an act to
constitute torture.165
According to the United States'
"understanding," "individuals who in good faith did not
intend to inflict such a level of pain would be innocent of
torture, even if their actions resulted in the infliction of such
pain.

' 16 6

United States federal law provides for the prohibition of
torture through the Torture Victim Protection Act, 67 the
Alien Tort Claims Act,16
and the Foreign Sovereign
169
Immunities Act.
These Acts provide civil remedies for
American citizens and non-citizens in American courts.
However, to meet its obligations under the Torture
Convention, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, which
specifically criminalized acts of torture committed "outside
the United States."7 °
163. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Addendum to Initial Report of Latvia, 6,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/21IAdd.4 (Aug. 30, 2002).
164. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Addendum to Third Periodic Report of
Luxembourg, T17, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/Add.14 (Feb. 19, 2001).
165. See VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 500.
166. Id.
167. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
168. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
169. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(7) (2006)
(withholding sovereign immunity from "state sponsors of terrorism" for acts of
torture).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
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In 2002, (then) Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee
wrote a memo to the former Council to the President, Alberto
Gonzales, interpreting § 2340(2) (the "Bybee Memo); 7 1 this
memo established an extraordinarily high threshold to satisfy
the "severe pain" requirement. Assistant Attorney General
Bybee stated that for an act to qualify as causing "severe
pain" under U.S. law, it must rise to "the level that would
ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious physical
condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious
impediment of bodily functions."1 7 2 The Bybee memo detailed
that additionally, "[t]he victim must experience intense pain
or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that
would be associated with serious physical injury so severe
that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a
17 3
loss of significant body function will likely result."
The Bybee Memo reflected the official United States
policy on torture until information about acts of torture
committed by United States military personnel emerged in
the summer of 2004.114 Photographs taken from Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq depicted dogs snarling at prisoners, women
ordered at gunpoint to expose their breasts, and forced
homosexual acts between prisoners.' 75 As a result of these
abuses, in June 2004, the Bybee memo was "withdrawn," and
replaced in December 2004 by a new memorandum written by
the subsequent Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Levin (the
176
"Levin Memo").
171. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 534 (providing a summary of
Assistant Attorney General Bybee's interpretation of the standards of conduct
for interrogation required by 18 U.S.C. § 2340A).
172. Id.
173. Id. The Bybee Memo also provides that "prolonged mental harm is
required to prove severe mental pain or suffering." Id.
174. Id.
175. See Dan Glaister & Julian Borger, 1,800 New Pictures Add to U.S.
Disgust, THE, GUARDIAN (London), May 13, 2004, at 5, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/13/iraq.usa.
176. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 13, at 534 (providing a summary of
Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin's interpretation of the standards of
conduct for interrogation required by 18 U.S.C. § 2340A). Although the Levin
Memo interpreted the "severe pain" requirement of the Torture Convention in a
less restrictive manner than the Bybee Memo, Levin's interpretation did not
define the broad principles it elaborated, and thus deviated from the purpose of
the Torture Convention. See id. The Levin Memo undercuts the Bybee Memo
by stating the United States does "not believe that Congress intended to reach
only conduct involving 'excruciating and agonizing pain or suffering.' " Id.
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Initially, the restatement of United States policy on
torture in the Levin Memo seemed to suggest the possibility
of improved adherence to the Torture Convention's definition.
However, even with newer, slightly broader standards, the
Levin Memo articulated that after "review[ing] this Office's
prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of
detainees [we] do not believe that any of their conclusions
would be different under the standards set forth in this
memorandum."' 7 7 Arguably, the new interpretation of the
torture definition did not provide new practices; it merely
shielded the United States with ambiguous phrasing.
The latest report submitted by the United States to the
CAT resulted in the CAT's further dissatisfaction with the
United States' interpretation of the Torture Convention's
The CAT expressed several concerns and
mandates.17
recommended that the United States enact and enforce a
federal statute that would prohibit acts of torture committed
outside of its borders. 179 It also urged the United States to
adopt "clear legal provisions to implement the principle of
absolute prohibition of torture in its domestic law without
Though the Bybee Memo is no
any possible derogations."'
longer considered representative of official United States
policy on the issue of torture and the Levin Memo purports to
improve U.S. adherence to the Torture Convention's
definition of torture, it appears that current United States
practices fail to meet CAT standards.''
Torture may be understood as either severe physical suffering or severe
physical pain, thus broadening the prohibited conduct, but no definition is
provided for either "suffering" or "pain." Id. Also, the " 'severe physical
suffering' must be a condition of some extended duration or persistence as well
as intensity;" but no definition is provided for what constitutes "extended
duration." Id.
177. MILLER, supra note 25, at 26 (quoting Assistant Attorney General
Daniel Levin's interpretation of the standards of conduct for interrogation
required by 18 U.S.C. § 2340A); LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE UNDER 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A: MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL

DANIEL

LEVIN

n.

8

(Dec.

30,

2004),

available

at

http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
178. U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Report of the Committee Against Torture at 6874 TT 13-41, U.N. Doc. A/61/44 (May 1-19, 2006).
179. Id. 9 22.
180. Id. 9 19. Further, the CAT recommended that the United States ensure
that acts of psychological torture are not limited to "prolonged mental harm."
Id. T 13.
181. Despite the United States' past defiance against meeting its obligations
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C. The Omission of the State Action or Public Official
Requirement
As seen through the current trend in international
criminal law, many States have deviated from the Torture
Convention's definition of torture with respect to the "public
official" or "state action" requirement. In consideration of the
initial Albanian report in May 2005, the CAT noted that "the
definition of torture in the Criminal Code does not cover all
the elements contained in Article 1 of the Convention,
1 82
especially regarding persons acting in an official capacity."
Similarly, in 2000, the CAT criticized "the impossibility of
prosecuting under existing Uzbek law, an individual guilty of
torture at the instigation of a law-enforcement officer."18 3 In
many of its communications with State parties, the CAT has
recommended that members include the "state action"
requirement, which reflects the reality that this particular
provision of the Torture Convention has been ignored widely
in the domestic definitions. Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Egypt,
Kazakhstan, Norway, and the Russian Federation are among
the many states that have omitted the "state action"
requirement in their definitions of torture. 8
The omission of the state actor requirement in the
domestic codes of State parties reflects a growing
international
trend.
As
evidenced
through
its
recommendations, the CAT urges States continually to
under the Torture Convention, newly elected President Barack Obama promises
meaningful change and a sharp break with Bush administration policies. On
January 22, 2009, President Obama signed a rather controversial executive
order, commanding that the CIA immediately cease using interrogation
techniques not authorized by the United States Field Manual. Exec. Order No.
13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009). Additionally, the order announced
that officers and agents of the United States government "may not... rely upon
any interpretation
of the law governing
interrogation-including
interpretations of... the [Torture] Convention ... issued by the Department of
Justice between September 11, 2001, and January 20, 2009." Id. This order
suggests not only a dramatic shift in United States policy, but also a renewed
endeavor to "observe core standards of conduct-not just when it's easy but also
when it's hard." Obama Orders CIA Prisons, GuantanamoShut, MSNBC, Jan.
22, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28788175.
182. U.N. GAOR, Report of the Committee Against Torture f 83(a), U.N. Doc.
A/60/44 (May 2-20, 2005).
183. U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess. Report of the Committee Against Torture
80(a), U.N. Doc. A/55/44 (Nov. 18-19, 1999).
184. See MILLER, supra note 25, at Al-A55 (summarizing definitions of
torture in over sixty countries around the world).
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recognize the importance of the state action requirement. The
CAT's concern is that failing to include this requirement
shields public officials who commit acts of torture from falling
On the other hand, the
within domestic definitions.18 5
omission of the state action requirement, if coupled with a
more clearly defined definition of torture, in fact may be a
positive development. As expressed by the ICTY in Kunarac,
"a violation of one of the relevant articles of the [torture]
Statute will engage the perpetrator's individual criminal
responsibility. In this context, the participation of the state
becomes secondary . .. [with or without the involvement of
the State, the crime remains of the same nature and bears
the same consequences."18 6
D. The Need for Clarity and Uniformity
Articulating a precise and universal definition of torture
First,
for the international community is essential.
governments must be bound by clear and constant standards
that cannot be manipulated, especially in times of crisis."8 7
Second, public officials need legislative guidance to determine
the lawfulness of certain tactics, particularly with respect to
Finally, the international
interrogation and detention.'
community must be able to hold States accountable for their
torturous acts with an unambiguous and unitary definition
that clearly delineates which acts constitute torture. 8 9 When
all can agree upon those acts that amount to torture, States
will no longer be able to escape the damaging effects of public
and political shaming that must accompany their crimes.
The legal conundrum before the international community
is not the lack of a definition; of those, there are many. The
challenge governments face is providing clarity to existing
definitions and creating uniformity among them. The lack of
a single definition "not only impedes torture prevention, but
bolsters a state's ability to avoid consequences through
dishonesty and hypocrisy." 9 ° A universal definition of torture
185. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 39, at 45.
186. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23-1, Judgment $ 493 (Feb.
22, 2001).
187. MILLER, supra note 25, at 1.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 4.
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would infuse the international community's rhetoric-which
so vehemently condemns torture-with meaning; it would
ensure that governments are held to the high standards
claimed in their anti-torture pronouncements. 19'
V. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The Torture Convention serves as a guidepost for
States throughout the world in the development of domestic
codes prohibiting torture. However, the main impediment to
the Torture Convention's ability to curb torture is its lack of a
clear definition of torture.'9 2 The duty to create a precise
definition and to provide governments with immutable limits
thus lies with the drafters of the Torture Convention. The
text of the Torture Convention must be revisited and
amended.
To make meaningful advances, the drafters must (1)
clarify ambiguous terms in the definition by either (a)
collapsing the Article 1 definitions of torture and CIDT into
one offense or (b), providing a hybrid test to determine what
constitutes "severe pain and suffering;" (2) omit the state
action requirement to open liability to private individuals as
well as public officials; and (3) amend Article 2 to require that
all member States employ the Torture Convention's
definition.
A. Clarify Ambiguous Terms in the Article 1 Definition
First, the Torture Convention must strive to clarify terms
that have created ambiguity in the past. The Supreme Court
of Israel explained in Public Committee Against Torture in
Israel v. Israel that successful interrogation requires a
193
measure of discomfort and an unequal balance of power.
Richard Posner suggested that torture begins at "the point
along a continuum at which the observer's queasiness turns
into revulsion." 9 4 This type of approach, which employs
subjective tests and standards that fail to provide specific
guidance, reflects international adherence to an unworkable
paradigm. The Torture Convention must create a line that
191. Id. at 5.
192. See id. at 36.
193. See Legality of S.S. Interrogation Methods, supra note 154, at 22.
194. Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE:
A COLLECTION 291 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
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separates permissible levels of discomfort from unlawful
acts.' 9' Two alternative paths may potentially accomplish
this task.
1.

Collapse the Definition of Torture and CIDT under
Article 1

Rather than continue to engage in the difficult task of
drawing distinctions between torture and CIDT, the Torture
Convention could collapse the two definitions into one. In
doing so, all acts that reach the lowest threshold, amounting
to CIDT, would be proscribed under international law and
criminalized accordingly. Because the Torture Convention
requires that States criminalize only acts of torture and not
CIDT, 9 ' one of the most troublesome aspects of torture
jurisprudence traditionally arises when courts face the thorny
task of placing acts on either side of the dividing line. Thus,
collapsing the two prohibitions found in Article 1 would serve
two important objectives. It would allow courts to evaluate
acts with a standardized template, creating consistency in
judicial decisions. If the range of impermissible actions were
broadened, courts would be likely to strike a more uniform
pattern of decisions.
This option would also take an
aggressive step toward the eradication of torture by
substantially lowering the punishable standard.
While this method would simplify a court's evaluation of
violations under the Torture Convention and would take an
ambitious stance in the fight to eliminate the practice of
torture and other CIDT, it presents important potential
drawbacks. First, despite its prohibition, no international
legal definition of CIDT currently exists.'9 7 Although it may
be easier to distinguish what amounts to CIDT in the context
of the enumerated purposes than to place certain acts upon a
continuum between CIDT and torture, a large degree of
ambiguity remains. Second, because collapsing the definition
broadens the range of illegal acts, States may be less willing
195. MILLER, supra note 25, at 36.
196. Torture Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4-5.
197. KERSTY MCCOURT & MANUEL LAMBERT, ORGANISATION MONDIALE
CONTRE LE TORTURE-EUROPE, INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF
TORTURE OR CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT IN
THE LIGHT OF EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW 8 (2004), available at

http://www.omct.org/pdf/OMCTEurope/2004/OMCTreport-DefinitionEU-3010
04.pdf.
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to sign or remain loyal to the Torture Convention. Clearly,
States that engage currently in torturous acts are the
subjects the Torture Convention seeks to target. With a
broadened definition, it is likely that these States would
withdraw completely from the Torture Convention, knowing
that if they were to remain parties, their actions would come
under strong criticism.
Finally, collapsing Article l's
provisions ultimately could have the international effect of
debasing the value of the word "torture," which would
undermine the goal of the Torture Convention altogether.
2. Implement a Hybrid Test to Determine What
Constitutes "Severe Pain and Suffering"
Alternatively and more realistically, the drafters should
rewrite the Torture Convention to include a clear definition of
the standards by which to evaluate the "severe pain and
suffering" requirement.
Currently, this requirement is
ambiguous and creates the most confusion in a State's
interpretation of the Torture Convention's definition. The
term "severe" is undefined in most state domestic codes or so
narrowly defined that little, if any, conduct meets its high
threshold.
The first task is to provide a precise legal
definition to which States will universally adhere.
Sculpting a clear definition of the term "severe" is
understandably difficult. The inherent subjectivity of the
term makes the defining characteristic of torture intangible.
Elaine Scarry speaks tellingly of the "unshareability" of
pain, 19 expressing the truth that underlies the dilemma:
"[P]hysical pain does not simply resist language, but actively
destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state
anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being
makes before language is learned."19 9 Scarry speaks to the
fact that no matter which words are employed to describe
pain, one can never know the internal pain or suffering of
another, for it is relative to the particularized experience and
sensibility of that individual." 0
The concept of "unshareability" demonstrates the strong
need for a subjective element in the test to determine whether
198.
OF THE
199.
200.

See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
WORLD 4 (1985).
Id.
See id. at 4-5.
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an act meets the "severity" requirement. It is for this reason
that, in the past, courts traditionally have considered the
duration of the treatment and its physical and mental effects
on the sex, age, and state of health of the victim. 2 1 However,
the high level of subjectivity currently applied when
interpreting the "severity" requirement has created an
inconsistent application of the term.
To accommodate this, courts should employ a hybrid test
involving both objective and subjective factors. One such test
is used commonly in tort law, where the general standard of
care involves a duty to act as a reasonable person in the same
or similar circumstances. 20 2 As articulated in a case from the
New York State Court of Appeals, " '[t] he standard of conduct
which the community demands must be an external and
objective one . . . of the particular actor.' "203 Courts apply
this standard because it "provides sufficient flexibility... for
case which may
all of the particular circumstances of20the
4
required."
conduct
the
affect
reasonably
This "reasonable person" principle should be translated
Courts should
into the realm of torture jurisprudence.
would
have upon
the
acts
in
question
the
effect
that
analyze
the average prudent person within the international
Additionally, to accommodate the need for
community.
subjectivity in the determination of "severe pain," the Torture
Convention should mandate an added component that
considers the totality of the circumstances such as the age,
sex, health, and possible disabilities affecting the victim, and
the nature, purpose, and duration of the acts upon the victim.
Courts may expand upon this idea by analyzing the
particular sensitivities of the victim, adhering to the tort
Under this
concept of the "eggshell-skull" plaintiff.205
principle, the perpetrators essentially "take the victim as they
find him." 20 6 In the torture context, this would mean that if
the perpetrator's actions caused an aggravation of the victim's
pre-existing condition or sensitivity, courts could hold the
201. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66 (1978).
202. MARK A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN, & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW

AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 31 (8th ed. Foundation Press 2006).
203. Bethel v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 703 N.E. 2d 1214, 1216 (N.Y. 1998)
(citation omitted).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1997).
205. See FRANKLIN, RABIN & GREEN, supra note 202, at 401.
206. Id. at 403.
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perpetrator liable for the full extent of the victim's injuries,
even where the reasonable person would not have felt "severe
pain" at all.2 °7 While this principle would be applied afterthe-fact for purposes of determining liability, it could serve as
a significant deterrent if torturers were aware that they were
subject to a standard that weighed heavily in favor of victims.
Using this hybrid standard, courts would exact more
consistent interpretations that would not vary as significantly
from case to case. The objective element would ground the
analysis in precedent while the subjective element would
allow each situation to be individualized to the particular
circumstances of the case.
In addition to the articulation of an analytical standard,
the Torture Convention's new description of the "severity"
requirement should assign a comprehensive, but nonexhaustive list of practices that cause "severe" pain or
suffering. The CAT provides hundreds of opinions that are
administered to signatory States. In these reports, CAT
specifically identifies certain elements of State procedures
that it considers to be violative of the Torture Convention's
Article 1(1).
These reports provide a source for the
identification of prohibited practices.
Alternatively, the
proposed amendment to the Torture Convention's "severity"
requirement could include a positive definition, defining the
types of interrogation techniques and detention procedures
that are considered acceptable, specifying that derogation
from these accepted practices constitutes a violation under
the Torture Convention. In either case, specific examples of
what conduct is proscribed or accepted, recorded in a nonexhaustive list, are necessary to propel the international
community toward a uniformly understood definition of
torture.
B. Remove the State Action Requirement
Third, to provide greater clarity and standardization in
the Torture Convention's definition of torture, the drafters
should omit the "state action" requirement. This omission
would stand as both a strengthening and unifying platform.
That so many courts, both international and domestic, have
eliminated this factor from their evaluation of torture reflects
207. See id.
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Elimination of this element would
a new consensus.
demonstrate that courts and States have recognized the
repugnance of torture and choose to focus upon individual
criminal liability, regardless of the perpetrator's status. The
customary definition of torture encompassed by a treaty
designed to implicate State liability is no longer a viable
option; since international criminal law applies to the
criminal conduct of individuals as well as state officials, it is
unreasonable to limit the prohibition of torture simply to acts
Further, the
of torture committed by state actors. °8
purposive requirement would remain in effect and would
serve primarily to implicate public officials, mitigating the
risk that public officials will be shielded from culpability.
C. Require All Member States to Implement the Torture
Convention's Definition into Their Domestic Codes
Lastly, and most importantly, the drafters of the Torture
Convention must revisit and amend Article 2. Allowing
States to implement individualized definitions of what
constitutes torture has resulted in a surfeit of definitions and
contradictions and a sense of unpredictability in courts'
decision-making. Moreover, it has allowed many States to
innovate in ways that allow them to officially placate the
Torture Convention while conducting practices that clearly
violate the Torture Convention's ideals. Torturers must not
be mollified by the freedom to create narrow definitions of
torture, undermining agreements that pledge adherence to
the universal prohibition of torture. Article 2 must demand
that parties to the Torture Convention apply its (amended)
definition for torture into their own domestic codes. This
would give the Torture Convention a binding quality, and it
would represent a powerful and dynamic stride toward the
eradication of torture.
VI. CONCLUSION

Torture is considered to be an atrocious violation of
human dignity and the human spirit. Indeed, it is a pariah of
State practice, condemned without qualification throughout
international and domestic legal codes. Yet the devastating
and permanent effects of torture continue to pervade the lives
208. See van der Vyver, supra note 64, at 432-33.
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of too many victims. The practice of torture persists, though
often cloaked in secrecy and shapelessness. The Torture
Convention, through its emphatic pronouncements, serves an
instrumental role in the international fight against torture.
However, since many elements of the Torture Convention's
definition remain unclear, States have been unsuccessful in
reaching agreement upon a universal understanding of the
definition of torture. Numerous definitions of the term have
manifested in torture jurisprudence. By incorporating the
prohibition of torture into their legal codes as commanded by
the Torture Convention, some States have been able to define
torture in ways that allow them to effectively escape the
reach of the crime. These State innovations have allowed
governments
to
employ
impermissible
methods
of
interrogation and punishment and to evade the consequences
effectively.
If torture is ever to be eradicated, the definition
contained in the Torture Convention must be amended: the
Torture Convention must clarify the terms of the definition of
torture so that State governments can no longer elude their
obligations. To do so, the drafters must revisit Article 1 of the
Torture Convention. First, the definition of torture and CIDT
contained in Article 1 should be collapsed so that all acts
categorized
between
ill-treatment
and
torture
are
criminalized. Second, the "severity" requirement must be
defined with clarity by employing a combined subjective and
objective test to determine if the "severe" pain and suffering
threshold has been met. That requirement also must include
a non-exhaustive list of acts that indisputably cause "severe"
pain and suffering.
This will provide guidance for
governments and a more rigid standard to which individuals
must adhere. Third, the drafters should omit the state action
requirement to open liability to private individuals as well as
public officials. Finally, Article 2 of the Torture Convention
must be amended to demand that signatory States employ
the official (amended) Torture Convention definition of
torture.
This will unify States' practices and hold
governments internationally accountable for their torturous
actions.
Indeed, these proposals are aggressive, and they require
the international community to take a tremendous step
forward in the battle against torture and CIDT. However, the
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Torture Convention's continued evolution demonstrates that
the international community can no longer tolerate torture.
Even if States that currently employ torture within their
territories are deterred from signing or adhering to the
Torture Convention, international shaming likely has the
potential to force the State's hand; States may feel politically
compelled to comply with the terms to protect their other
international interests.
States can no longer afford to turn a blind eye, allowing
the crushing "neutrality"2 9 to inflict further suffering upon
innocent victims. In the end, "[fireedom from torture is a
fundamental human right that must be protected under all
circumstances. Growing awareness of international legal
instruments and protection mechanisms gives hope that the
wall of silence
around this terrible practice is gradually being
210
eroded."

209. See Wiesel, supra note 1.
210. MILLER, supra note 25, at 5 (citing Press Release, United Nations,
Freedom from Torture "Fundamental Human Right," Says Secretary-General
(June 26, 2001), available at www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/
sgsm7855.html).

